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It is widely acknowledged that a complete theory of consciousness should explain general
consciousness (what makes a state conscious at all) and speciﬁc consciousness (what
gives a conscious state its particular phenomenal quality).We defend ﬁrst-order represen-
tationalism, which argues that consciousness consists of sensory representations directly
available to the subject for action selection, belief formation, planning, etc. We provide
a neuroscientiﬁc framework for this primarily philosophical theory, according to which
neural correlates of general consciousness include prefrontal cortex, posterior parietal
cortex, and non-speciﬁc thalamic nuclei, while neural correlates of speciﬁc consciousness
include sensory cortex and speciﬁc thalamic nuclei. We suggest that recent data
support ﬁrst-order representationalism over biological theory, higher-order representation-
alism, recurrent processing theory, information integration theory, and global workspace
theory.
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The last two decades have witnessed a renaissance of scientiﬁc
inquiry into consciousness. Several theoretical contenders have
emerged, including biological theory, higher-order representation-
alism, recurrent processing theory, information integration theory,
and global workspace theory. This article outlines another proposal,
ﬁrst-order representationalism, which has been inﬂuential among
philosophers but has received scant neuroscientiﬁc attention. In
this article,we state the testable differences betweenﬁrst-order rep-
resentationalism and its rivals, and argue that current data favor
ﬁrst-order representationalism.
The core idea of ﬁrst-order representationalism is that any con-
scious state is a representation, andwhat it’s like to be in a conscious
state is wholly determined by the content of that representation. By
deﬁnition, a representation is about something, and the content of
a representation is what the representation is about. For instance,
the word “dolphins” (representation) is about dolphins (content);
Herbert Bix’s book Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (rep-
resentation) is about the life of the Japanese emperor Hirohito
(content); and the classic fairy tale Snow White (representation) is
about the princess Snow White and an evil queen who tries to kill
her (content). To express the ﬁrst-order representationalist view
in a (helpful but simpliﬁed) slogan: consciousness is the story that
our perceptual systems tell us about the world. This is, of course,
a substantial and controversial hypothesis, as many would dispute
that our perceptual systems genuinely represent the world to us in
this rich sense (Travis, 2004).
Three clariﬁcations are in order. First clariﬁcation: though a
representation has content, a representation is not identical to its
content. For example, the representation “dolphins” is an English
word with eight letters, but its content – dolphins – does not have
any letters. Conversely, dolphins swim, but the word “dolphins”
does not swim. This point underlies one major philosophical
motivation of representationalism: the fact that neural states seem
to have very different properties than conscious perceptions. For
instance, when someone consciously perceives the color orange,
normally there is nothing orange in that person’s brain. First-
order representationalists explain this by holding that a conscious
perception of orange is a representation of orange, and (as the
“dolphin” example shows) the properties of a representation can
be very different from the properties of its content (Dretske, 1995,
1999, 2003; Tye, 1995, 2000; Lycan, 1996).
Second clariﬁcation: the content of a representation can be
false, and can concern a non-existent thing. Though Bix’s biogra-
phy of Hirohito is carefully researched, doubtless it contains some
false sentences. More to the point, the story of Snow White is
about someone who does not exist. According to representation-
alists, this explains why illusions, dreams, and hallucinations are
possible: consciousness can misrepresent the world.
Third clariﬁcation: ﬁrst-order representationalism does not
hold that every contentful representation is conscious. For
example, early vision may contain unconscious representations
(perhaps with contents concerning line orientations and light
gradients), and theNewYorkTimes newspaper containsmany rep-
resentations that are not conscious. Thus, Tye (1995) suggests that
a conscious representation must be poised to interact directly with
one’s beliefs and desires, and similarlyDretske (2006) hypothesizes
that a conscious representationmust be available to the subject as a
reason for action and belief formation. Below, we will reﬁne these
ideas from Tye and Dretske.
Stated at this high-level of abstraction, ﬁrst-order represen-
tationalism delivers little in the way of scientiﬁcally testable
predictions. This article explores a neuroanatomical interpretation
www.frontiersin.org July 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 407 | 1
“fpsyg-04-00407” — 2013/7/12 — 19:41 — page 2 — #2
Mehta and Mashour First-order representationalism
of ﬁrst-order representationalism that delivers testable predic-
tions separating it from rival scientiﬁc theories. In doing so, we
present a novel approach to the neural correlates of consciousness
(deﬁned below) that organizes general and speciﬁc conscious-
ness in a functional relationship of post-sensory and sensory
systems.
The discussion will proceed as follows. §1 distinguishes gen-
eral consciousness (which pertains to the“level”of consciousness)
from speciﬁc consciousness (which pertains to the “content”
of consciousness) and also characterizes the post-sensory and
sensory systems that participate in conscious processing. §2
summarizes several inﬂuential theories of consciousness and cate-
gorizes them according to which of these systems are hypothesized
to be the neural correlates of general and speciﬁc consciousness.
We argue that only ﬁrst-order representationalism identiﬁes post-
sensory systems as the neural correlates of general consciousness
and sensory systems as the neural correlates of speciﬁc conscious-
ness. §3 argues that post-sensory systems are the neural correlates
of general consciousness, while §4 argues that sensory systems are
the neural correlates of speciﬁc consciousness, just as ﬁrst-order
representationalism predicts.
1. FRAMING THE PROBLEM(S) OF CONSCIOUSNESS
Let us begin by clarifying the phenomenon to be explained:
consciousness. According to Block (1995, 2007), scientists and
philosophers discussing “consciousness” have often conﬂated two
quite different properties: access consciousness and phenomenal
consciousness. To a ﬁrst approximation, a mental state is access
conscious if and only if one can directly and spontaneously use its
content in action (including speech) and reasoning. By contrast,
a mental state is phenomenally conscious if there is “something
it’s like,” in the inﬂuential phrase of Nagel (1974), to be in that
state. This paper focuses primarily on phenomenal consciousness,
though issues of access consciousness crop up occasionally. In
order to avoid confusion, we will always use the term “conscious-
ness” to refer to phenomenal consciousness, and we will speak of
“access” instead of “access consciousness.”Additionally, wewill use
the term phenomenal character to refer to “what it’s like” to be in a
given conscious state.
Several theorists (Rees et al., 2002; Hurley and Noë, 2003;
Tononi, 2004; Kriegel, 2009) have observed that a complete theory
of consciousness must explain two separate phenomena. The ﬁrst
is what we term general consciousness: whatmakes a state conscious
at all, as opposed to wholly unconscious. This part of a given the-
ory should explain the difference between, e.g., one’s conscious
state when one sees a red thing and one’s unconscious state when
one is anesthetized.
Second, the theorymust explainwhatwe term speciﬁc conscious-
ness: what gives a state its speciﬁc phenomenal character, rather
than some alternative phenomenal character. This part of a given
theory should explain the difference between one’s conscious state
when one sees something red and one’s conscious state when one
sees something green (or hears a loud noise, or feels pain). Speciﬁc
consciousness presupposes general consciousness, since there can
be no speciﬁc conscious state if the subject is not conscious at all.
However, two individuals may both have general consciousness
while differing in their speciﬁc consciousness.
To further elucidate the relationship between general con-
sciousness and speciﬁc consciousness, consider an analogy. Pride
and Prejudice is a book by Jane Austen. Certain factors make it a
book at all – the fact that it has pages, a front and back cover, a
binding, etc. Other factors make it the speciﬁc book that it is – the
fact that it contains speciﬁc words in a speciﬁc order, was written
by Jane Austen, etc. Similarly, general consciousness is what makes
a state conscious at all, while speciﬁc consciousness is what makes
a state the speciﬁc conscious state that it is.
This distinction between general and speciﬁc consciousness
corresponds roughly to the existing distinction between the
“level” and the “content” of consciousness (Hohwy, 2009; Over-
gaard and Overgaard, 2010; Bachmann, 2012). However, since
we are using the term “content” in the technical way deﬁned
above, we will continue to use the general/speciﬁc terminology
instead. Additionally, we acknowledge that cortical arousal, or
the capacity for cortical arousal – which is mediated primarily by
subcortical structures in the brainstem, diencephalon, and basal
forebrain – is a necessary precondition for consciousness. How-
ever, these subcortical structures do not constitute consciousness
per se. This is clearly evidenced in certain pathological condi-
tions such as vegetative states, in which arousal or sleep–wake
patterns can be present in the absence of consciousness (Lau-
reys, 2005). Thus, we do not discuss these subcortical structures
further.
Scientists have often sought the neural correlates of conscious-
ness – the set of neural events and mechanisms that directly
constitute (general or speciﬁc) consciousness. These differ from
the neural prerequisites of consciousness, which are necessary for
consciousness without directly constituting it, and from the neu-
ral consequences of consciousness,which result fromconsciousness
rather than directly constituting it (Aru et al., 2012; De Graaf et al.,
2012).
Broadly speaking, two types of systems participate in con-
scious processing. Sensory systems are dedicated to the detection
of highly speciﬁc perceptible features. These systems may be tuned
to modality-speciﬁc properties (such as color and tone) or proper-
ties detectible via multiple modalities (such as motion and spatial
location), and the same localized neural region may be tuned to
different perceptible properties over time (Lamme and Roelfsema,
2000). Post-sensory systems perform a broad variety of functions,
including modulation of sensory processing via top-down atten-
tion, distribution of sensory information via a global workspace
(Dehaene and Changeux, 2011), and estimation of signal quality
(Lau, 2008).
For example, consider visual processing, which includes both a
fast feedforward sweep and slower recurrent processing loops (also
known as feedback, reentrant, reafferent, or reverberant process-
ing; Lamme and Roelfsema, 2000; Lamme, 2006, 2010; Treisman,
2006; VanRullen, 2007; Dehaene et al., 2011). In the feedforward
sweep, which is completed in about 100 ms, activation proceeds in
a swift, unidirectional cascade from the retina, to the lateral genic-
ulate nucleus of the thalamus, to V1 in the occipital cortex, to
higher visual processing areas (including V2,V3,V4, and V5), and
ﬁnally to more rostral structures. By contrast, recurrent processing
loops involve reciprocal information transfer between these cor-
tical areas, and corresponding thalamic regions (Jones, 2009), via
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horizontal and feedback connections. Recurrent processing may
occur at many scales, from a local scale (within a sensory modal-
ity) to a global scale (implicating executive function or spanning
different sensory modalities).
Plausibly, visual sensory systems dedicated to processing highly
speciﬁc properties include occipital and temporal cortex (such as
V1,V2,V3,V4, and V5), as well as the lateral geniculate nucleus of
the thalamus. By contrast, many areas in the frontal and posterior
parietal cortex, as well as thalamic non-speciﬁc (or matrix) nuclei
associated with such areas (Jones, 2009), are strong candidates
for post-sensory systems. These post-sensory systems tend to be
multimodal association cortices that serve as highly connected
hubs performing a wide range of functions (Gong et al., 2009).
Although the sensory/post-sensory distinction may not be per-
fectly sharp, we believe that it is sharp enough to be helpful
in philosophical and scientiﬁc categorization. Consequently, the
next section uses this framework to categorize theories of con-
sciousness according to which systems (sensory or post-sensory)
are hypothesized to be the neural correlates of general or spe-
ciﬁc consciousness. The commitments of scientiﬁc theories of
consciousness with respect to this framework have usually been
implicit. As such, we will make them as explicit as possible, which
requires some degree of interpretation.
2. THEORIES OF CONSCIOUSNESS
It is widely accepted that consciousness is realized in neural states.
However, is consciousness also identical to neural states, so that
something without neural states (such as a robot) cannot possibly
have the same kinds of conscious states as a human being? The
biological theory answers this question afﬁrmatively. To explain
speciﬁc consciousness, many biological theorists hold that each
speciﬁc type of conscious state corresponds to a speciﬁc type of
neural state. For instance, Block (2009) hypothesizes that con-
sciousness of motion is simply activation of visual areaV5 (as long
as this activation is of a certain sort, and is properly embedded in a
certain sort of biological system), and similarly Zeki (2007) identi-
ﬁes consciousness of color with activation of V4. This suggests that
sensory systems are the neural correlates of speciﬁc consciousness.
Moreover, Block (2009) speculates that functional connections
between these cortical areas and the thalamus are required for
consciousness in general, which suggests that sensory and perhaps
post-sensory systems (depending on which thalamic regions are
involved) are the neural correlates of general consciousness, as
well.
Next, consider higher-order representationalism, which is amore
complex version of ﬁrst-order representationalism. While ﬁrst-
order representationalists posit an array of ﬁrst-order perceptual
representations directed at theworld, higher-order representation-
alists additionally posit an array of higher-order representations
(either thoughts or perceptions) directed at these ﬁrst-order per-
ceptual representations. To explain general consciousness, higher-
order representationalists hold that a state is conscious in virtue
of being targeted by (or perhaps being disposed to be targeted
by Carruthers, 2000, 2005) higher-order representations. Some
higher-order representationalists hold that speciﬁc phenomenal
character is determined entirely by the content of higher-order
representations (Rosenthal, 2005), while others appeal to the
content of both ﬁrst-order and higher-order representations (Lau,
2008, 2010; Kriegel, 2009).
In neural terms, Lau and Rosenthal (2011) hypothesize that
higher-order representations are harbored in post-sensory sys-
tems, such as posterior parietal regions and especially the dor-
solateral prefrontal cortex, while ﬁrst-order representations are
harbored in sensory systems. Although this neural interpretation is
not forced on higher-order representationalists, wewill henceforth
adopt it because (a) several higher-order representationalists have
endorsed this interpretation, and (b) higher-order representation-
alism is very difﬁcult to test scientiﬁcally without some neural
interpretation. Given this interpretation, higher-order represen-
tationalists identify post-sensory areas as the neural correlates of
general consciousness; they identify post-sensory and perhaps also
sensory areas as the neural correlates of speciﬁc consciousness.
Lamme (2006) proposes the recurrent processing theory, accord-
ing to which recurrent processing (as described in §1) is necessary
and sufﬁcient for general consciousness. Lamme holds that recur-
rent processing can occur in both sensory and post-sensory areas.
Additionally, while Lamme is not entirely explicit about how to
explain speciﬁc consciousness, the obvious approach is to say that
speciﬁc phenomenal character is determined by which areas are
engaged in recurrent processing, which again comprises sensory
and post-sensory areas.
Information integration theory holds that consciousness
requires two elements: information, understood as the ability to
discriminate among a large number of alternatives, and integra-
tion, understood as whether or not a system functions as a uniﬁed
whole, rather than as separate components (Tononi, 2004, 2008).
With respect to general consciousness, information integration
theory says that the degree of consciousness that a systempossesses
at a time is determined by the degree of integrated information
it possesses at that time. Since this will, in turn, be determined
by corticothalamic networks spanning the brain, the hypothesis
takes sensory and post-sensory systems as the neural correlates of
general consciousness. Further, with respect to speciﬁc conscious-
ness, it claims that the speciﬁc character of a conscious state is
wholly determined by the set of informational relationships of a
system with integrated information (Tononi, 2008). That is, the
mechanisms constituting consciousness discriminate one infor-
mational state from all other possible states of the system, and
this precise discrimination determines the speciﬁc phenomenal
character of the state. Since all informational relationships are rel-
evant to determining speciﬁc phenomenal character, information
integration theory also takes sensory and post-sensory systems to
constitute speciﬁc consciousness.
We now turn to global workspace theory, which posits many
specialized and localized mental processes. Information from a
select few of these processes are collected in a global workspace
(typically identiﬁed with working memory), and this informa-
tion is widely disseminated throughout the brain via long-range
neuronal connections. According to global workspace theory, a
state is conscious in virtue of its outputs being disseminated via
the global workspace, which is neurally realized in cortical and
thalamocortical networks distributed throughout the brain but
which is especially dense in prefrontal, cingulate, and parietal
regions (Baars, 2002, 2005; Baars and Franklin, 2003; Dehaene and
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Changeux, 2003, 2011; Sergent and Dehaene, 2004; Dehaene et al.,
2006, 2011). While these networks consist of post-sensory areas,
they relay information from sensory areas. Thus, sensory and
post-sensory systems are identiﬁed as the neural correlates of gen-
eral consciousness. Global workspace theory also implicates these
same systems as the neural correlates of speciﬁc consciousness,
since speciﬁc phenomenal character is determined by which neu-
rons are active and which are inactive within the global workspace
(Dehaene et al., 2011).
Finally, let us return to ﬁrst-order representationalism. Recall
that, according to this theory, consciousness is hypothesized to
consist in (i) ﬁrst-order representations directed at the world
which (ii) are directly available to the subject for action selec-
tion, belief formation, planning, etc. Condition (i) embodies
an approach to speciﬁc consciousness: the speciﬁc phenomenal
character of a representation is determined wholly by its con-
tent. Condition (ii) complements this with an approach to general
consciousness: for a representation to be conscious rather than
unconscious is for it to be directly available to the subject for
action selection, belief formation, planning, etc.
We will now provide a neural framework for this theory. As
mentioned above, we deem arousal or the capacity for arousal
(as mediated primarily by subcortical structures in the brainstem,
diencephalon and basal forebrain) as a necessary precondition
for consciousness, rather than a constitutive factor. Further,
with respect to (i), we hypothesize (in agreement with Lau and
Rosenthal, 2011) that these ﬁrst-order representations are gener-
ated by sensory systems. In visual processing, for example, we
hypothesize (with theorists like Block and Zeki) that V4 con-
tains representations of color and V5 contains representations of
motion.
To characterize direct availability neurally, we incorporate ele-
ments of global workspace theory. Recall that global workspace
theory posits a process whereby information is selected and widely
distributed throughout the brain via post-sensory long-range neu-
rons especially dense in prefrontal, cingulate, and parietal regions.
(Based on research discussed below, we hypothesize that posterior
parietal cortex plays an especially important role.) This process
of information selection and distribution integrates such diverse
brain functions as attention, long-term memory, motor control,
and evaluation (Dehaene et al., 2011). We tentatively hypothesize
that the subject is constituted by the integrated activity of such
diverse brain functions. Thus, we hold that these post-sensory cor-
tical systems, and the relevant thalamic matrix neurons, underlie
direct availability to the subject and are thus the neural correlates
of general consciousness. This version of ﬁrst-order representa-
tionalism is a close cousin of global workspace theory with respect
to general consciousness, but diverges from global workspace the-
ory with respect to speciﬁc consciousness. Table 1 summarizes this
information.
There is one substantial complication, which we mention only
to set aside. Some argue that consciousness can overﬂow access
(Block, 1995, 2007, 2011; Lamme, 2003; Tye, 2010), while oth-
ers disagree (Prinz, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2011; Dehaene et al., 2006;
Kouider et al., 2007, 2010; De Brigard and Prinz, 2010; Cohen
and Dennett, 2011; Phillips, 2011; Brown, 2012). We remain
neutral on this controversial topic, since ﬁrst-order representa-
tionalism is compatible with either view. If consciousness does
overﬂow access, then ﬁrst-order representationalists can accom-
modate this by holding that ﬁrst-order representations can be
conscious merely in virtue of being poised for distribution via
the global workspace, even if they are not actually distributed. If
consciousness does not overﬂow access, then consciousness can
be understood straightforwardly as distribution via the global
workspace.
Since only ﬁrst-order representationalism identiﬁes post-
sensory systems as the neural correlates of general consciousness
and sensory systems as the neural correlates of speciﬁc conscious-
ness, ﬁrst-order representationalism makes testable predictions
distinguishing it from the alternative theories discussed. It pre-
dicts that selective impairment of post-sensory systems, such as
prefrontal cortex, posterior parietal cortex, and regions of the tha-
lamus,will result in an impaired ability to generate conscious states
at all, but that no such impairment will result from impairments
of sensory systems alone. These predictions separate ﬁrst-order
representationalism from biological theory, recurrent processing
Table 1 |Theories of consciousness.
Theory Consciousness is. . . Systems constituting general NCC Systems constituting specific NCC
Biological theory Identical to neural states Sensory, possibly post-sensory Sensory
Higher-order representationalism Activation of higher-order
representations directed at
ﬁrst-order sensory representations
Post-sensory Post-sensory, possibly sensory
Recurrent processing theory Recurrent processing Sensory, post-sensory Sensory, post-sensory
Information integration theory Integrated information Sensory, post-sensory Sensory, post-sensory
Global workspace theory Global information availability Sensory, post-sensory Sensory, post-sensory
First-order representationalism Activation of ﬁrst-order
representations (poised to be)
distributed via the global workspace
Post-sensory Sensory
NCC, neural correlates of consciousness.
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theory, information integration theory, and global workspace
theory. Second, it predicts that selectively impairing sensory sys-
tems will selectively impair the ability to experience speciﬁc types
of conscious states without impairing the ability to experience
other types of conscious states. Selectively impairing post-sensory
systems will not have this effect. These predictions separate ﬁrst-
order representationalism from higher-order representationalism,
recurrent processing theory, information integration theory, and
global workspace theory.
Next, §3 will argue that the ﬁrst-order representational-
ist predictions about general consciousness are consistent with
current data, and §4 will argue that the ﬁrst-order representation-
alist predictions about speciﬁc consciousness are consistent with
current data.
3. GENERAL CONSCIOUSNESS
The claim that the neural correlates of general consciousness
include post-sensory systems in prefrontal cortex, posterior pari-
etal cortex, and non-speciﬁc thalamic nuclei is strongly supported
by many types of studies. First, consider data suggesting that
sensory processing alone appears insufﬁcient for general con-
sciousness. Boveroux et al. (2010) found preservation of func-
tional networks subservingprimary visual and auditory processing
during deep sedation. Meanwhile, prefrontal cortex (especially
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) appears relevant to general con-
sciousness under some conditions. For example, Lau and Passing-
ham (2006) used a metacontrast masking paradigm to create two
conditions with matched performance of discriminating two tar-
gets, but where subjects in one condition were much more likely
to report seeing the target. fMRI data revealed differences between
these conditions only in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (and not,
for example, in sensory processing areas). Additionally, transcra-
nial magnetic stimulation applied to dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
alone can decrease the likelihood that subjects report seeing a tar-
get (Rounis et al., 2010). Because of the interventional nature of
transcranial magnetic stimulation, this suggests that dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex is not merely a neural consequence of general
consciousness, but is instead a genuine neural correlate. The fact
that general consciousness does not wholly disappear under dis-
ruption of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex suggests that this area
is not the sole neural correlate of general consciousness.
Långsjö et al. (2012) and Ku et al. (2011) assessed loss and
return of consciousness in anesthetized subjects. Loss of con-
sciousness was associatedwith decreased frontoparietal connectiv-
ity (Ku et al., 2011), while return of consciousness was associated
with an increase in frontoparietal connectivity (Ku et al., 2011;
Långsjö et al., 2012). Notably, these results also implicate the poste-
rior parietal cortex in general consciousness. However, it is unlikely
that prefrontal cortex is the sole neural correlate of general con-
sciousness, given the well-known suppression of frontal activity
during rapid-eye-movement (REM) sleep, which is strongly asso-
ciated with dream consciousness (Maquet et al., 1996; Hobson and
Pace-Schott, 2002).
The thalamus also plays a substantial role in supporting general
consciousness. Alkire and Miller (2005) report that, across eight
different anesthetic agents, depression of the thalamus is more
strongly correlated with anesthesia than local effects anywhere else
in the brain. Further, recent data suggest that anesthetic effectsmay
preferentially inhibit the non-speciﬁc thalamic nuclei and that this
inhibition correlates best with cognitive changes during loss of
consciousness in humans (Liu et al., 2013). This is consistent with
our view that the non-speciﬁc thalamic nuclei are part of a post-
sensory processing system that mediates general consciousness.
Recall that our neural version of ﬁrst-order representationalism
holds that general consciousness requires availability of sensory
content to a set of distributed post-sensory systems (realized in
prefrontal cortex, posterior parietal cortex, and thalamus)working
in an integrated fashion (as described by global workspace theory).
If this is correct, then perhaps no single post-sensory system is
required for general consciousness. Rather, integrated activity of a
substantial number of post-sensory systems is required for general
consciousness. This hypothesis explains the above data concern-
ing deactivation of prefrontal cortex during sleep and is further
supported by a number of experiments. For example, Massimini
et al. (2010) observed a pattern of widespread cortical activation
associated with transcranial magnetic stimulation in the waking
state. This pattern persisted, though less robustly, in REM sleep
(associated with dreaming consciousness) and was virtually extin-
guished during non-REM (NREM) sleep (associated with little to
no consciousness) and during general anesthesia (Ferrarelli et al.,
2010). Similarly, Del Cul et al. (2007) found that consciousness in
amasking paradigmwas associatedwith highly distributed fronto-
parieto-temporal activation. Such data underscore the signiﬁcance
of widespread cortical activation for general consciousness.
Moreover, not all post-sensory processing is conscious. For
example, inhibitory control is mediated largely by the prefrontal
cortex, a paradigmatic post-sensory region. Recent studies sug-
gest that inhibitory control can occur unconsciously (Hughes
et al., 2009; van Gaal et al., 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011; van Gaal and
Lamme, 2011). Similarly, prefrontal cognitive control functions
such as task-set preparation may be discharged unconsciously
(Lau and Passingham, 2007). As ﬁrst-order representationalists
predict, there was no widespread activation of cortical networks
associated with the global workspace in these experiments. Only
localized activation of post-sensory regions occurred (Dehaene
and Changeux, 2011; van Gaal and Lamme, 2011).
Onemight argue that, rather than subserving consciousness per
se, post-sensory processing merely subserves attention or access to
sensory systems, which are in fact the neural correlates of general
consciousness. On this view, post-sensory processing is a neural
consequence of consciousness. One argument for this is neural:
Lamme (2003) suggests that the neural basis of attention involves
increased activity in frontoparietal regions which is shaped by
a combination of sensory processing, short-term memory, and
long-term memory. By contrast, he argues that consciousness
requires recurrent processing. Backward masking, which ren-
ders stimuli unreportable, suppresses recurrent processing while
leaving the feedforward sweep largely intact (Lamme and Roelf-
sema, 2000). Moreover, transcranial magnetic stimulation that
disrupts recurrent but not feedforward processing still leaves sub-
jects unable to report seeing anything, and feedforward processing
persists without recurrent processing in anesthetized animals
(Lamme, 2003). Thus, Lamme concludes that the neural cor-
relates of consciousness include recurrent processing. Although
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Lamme focuses primarily on recurrent processingwithin the visual
modalities, others theorize that more global recurrent processing
from anterior to posterior post-sensory brain regions is critical for
general consciousness (Dehaene and Changeux, 2011; Changeux,
2012).
We reply that ﬁrst-order representationalism is perfectly com-
patible with these data: as discussed in the next section, the neural
correlates of speciﬁc consciousness may well include recurrent
processing. However, some preliminary evidence argues against
the hypothesis that the sole contribution of post-sensory pro-
cessing is to enable attention or access. For example, Del Cul
et al. (2009) studied patients with frontal lesions and found that
such patients displayed impaired abilities to report seeing masked
stimuli and to select the appropriate response in a forced-choice
identiﬁcation task, compared to control subjects. However, this
appears not to be an attentional deﬁcit, for such patients bene-
ﬁted from both temporal and spatial cues, and the threshold for
reportable perception was consistently higher for these patients
across four different attentional conditions.
More studies are required to rule out the hypothesis that the
sole contribution of post-sensory processing is to enable non-
attentional access. Nevertheless, the simplest explanation of the
current data is that, assuming cortical arousal (as in the wak-
ing state and during REM sleep), post-sensory processing regions
alone are the neural correlates of general consciousness. This
result favors ﬁrst-order representationalism and higher-order rep-
resentationalism, which both predict this result. It undermines
biological theory, which (as it has been speciﬁed by its advocates)
identiﬁes sensory (and perhaps also post-sensory) processing
regions as the neural correlates of general consciousness. It also
undermines information integration theory and global workspace
theory, which identify both sensory and post-sensory processing
regions as the neural correlates of general consciousness. The next
section considers speciﬁc consciousness.
4. SPECIFIC CONSCIOUSNESS
A large body of experimental ﬁndings supports the hypothesis
that speciﬁc phenomenal character is determined solely by sen-
sory systems. The best evidence for this claim is that activation
of localized sensory areas is tightly associated with speciﬁc con-
scious states. For example, many studies show that activation of
V4 is strongly associated with consciousness of color: fMRI data
show selective activation of V4 in the experience of color across
a variety of paradigms (Bartels and Zeki, 2000), and damage to
V4 leads to the inability to see color (Zeki, 1990). Similarly, recent
studies have associated distinct sensory areas with the processing
of texture, color, shape/form, and glossiness (Cant et al., 2009;
Cavina-Pratesi et al., 2010a,b; Kentridge et al., 2012). Additionally,
many studies suggest that activation of V5 is tightly associated
with consciousness of motion. Lesions of V5 in humans and mon-
keys result in severe deﬁcits in motion perception (Schenk and
Zihl, 1997). Further, V5 is differentially activated when subjects
experience illusory motion (Zeki et al., 1993) and implied motion
(e.g., when one sees a still photo of an object obviously in motion;
Kourtzi and Kanwisher, 2000).
Surprisingly, such results hold up even across modalities. Saenz
et al. (2008) provide fMRI data for early-blind subjects who
recovered limited vision in adulthood. In these cases,V5was differ-
entially activatedbymoving visual and auditory stimuli. Moreover,
Poirier et al. (2006) report similar results based on fMRI data: areas
typically associated with visual processing of motion are, in blind
subjects, associated with auditory processing of motion. Addi-
tionally, Ricciardi et al. (2011) found that selectively disabling V5
with transcranial magnetic stimulation signiﬁcantly impaired the
ability of subjects to detect tactile motion.
However, some experiments suggest that V5 activation in the
absenceofV1 activationdoesnot result in consciousness of motion
(Cowey and Walsh, 2000; Pascual-Leone and Walsh, 2001). Thus,
we leave open the possibility that consciousness of motion requires
recurrent processing between V5 and areas such as V1. More
broadly,we leave open the possibility that all speciﬁc consciousness
requires recurrent processing (as Lamme, 2006, 2010 suggest).
Nonetheless, two alternative views are worth considering.
First, one may hold that these data concern unconscious or
pre-conscious processing, rather than full-ﬂedged conscious pro-
cessing (Dehaene et al., 2006). On this view, differences in sensory
processing are neural prerequisites of consciousness: they cause
differences in post-sensory processing, but only these post-sensory
states are genuinely conscious. Second, one may argue that some
speciﬁc phenomenal character is determined by sensory process-
ing, while other speciﬁc phenomenal character is determined by
post-sensory processing (Lau, 2008, 2010). However, the same
problem afﬂicts both replies. Both of these approaches predict that
selectively disabling post-sensory areas will also selectively disable
the ability to undergo speciﬁc conscious states (just as disabling
V5 also selectively disables the ability to be in the speciﬁc con-
scious states associated with motion). However, so far as we know,
no effect of this sort has been reported. As discussed in Section
“General Consciousness,” disabling post-sensory systems leads to
a general deﬁcit in consciousness. However, clear examples of spe-
ciﬁc deﬁcits in consciousness resulting from local disruption of
post-sensory systems have not been found.
In sum, these data strongly suggest that processing in sensory
systems alone is the neural correlate of speciﬁc consciousness.
This result is predicted by ﬁrst-order representationalism and
biological theory but poses problems for higher-order representa-
tionalism, information integration theory, and global workspace
theory. Since the previous section argued that current forms of
the biological theory are unpromising with respect to general
consciousness, we conclude that a diverse body of data presently
supports ﬁrst-order representationalism.
CONCLUSION
We have argued that disentangling general and speciﬁc conscious-
ness leads to substantial progress: post-sensory systems are strong
candidates for the neural correlates of general consciousness, while
sensory systems are strong candidates for the neural correlates of
speciﬁc consciousness. Of existing theories of consciousness that
supply enoughneural detail to be directly empirically testable, only
ﬁrst-order representationalism makes these predictions.
However, we freely admit that rival theories of consciousness
could be substantially modiﬁed to accommodate these data. For
example, one could hold a higher-order representationalist view
according to which a state is conscious if and only if it is the
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target of a higher-order representation, but speciﬁc phenomenal
character is determined solely by the content of the targeted ﬁrst-
order representation. Similarly, a biological theorist could posit
that prefrontal cortex, posterior parietal cortex, and non-speciﬁc
thalamic nuclei constitute general consciousness. It remains to be
seen whether such modiﬁcations can be made while respecting the
initialmotivations for these theories. Regardless, we conclude that,
of the major theoretical options as they have been neurally speciﬁed
by their advocates, ﬁrst-order representationalism currently best
ﬁts the data.
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